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What	could	Brexit	mean	for	UK	public	spending	and
devolved	government	relations?
In	the	London-centric	world	of	our	national	media,	little	consideration	has	been	given	to	what	Brexit
means	for	UK	public	spending	and	for	devolved	government	relations.	David	Heald	outlines	some	of
the	long-term	issues	that	are	being	neglected,	and	explains	their	importance.
What	is	remarkable	about	the	public	discussion	on	Brexit	since	the	2016	Referendum	is	that	it	has
consistently	focused	on	the	wrong	things.	The	‘divorce	bill’	remains	politically	toxic,	but	it	is	fiscally
irrelevant.	Paying	it	off	as	a	lump	sum	would	have	put	the	UK	net	debt/GDP	ratio	up	from	87%	to
90%,	the	ratio	having	been	48%	in	2008	before	the	global	financial	crisis.
The	toxicity	stems	in	part	from	decades	of	the	UK	complaining	about	making	‘huge	contributions’	to	Brussels,
although	in	fact,	net	UK	contributions	are	only	about	1%	of	total	public	spending.	My	personal	view	is	that	the	UK
should	have	made	a	lump-sum	payment,	to	avoid	decades	of	entanglement	with	EU	decisions	concerning	liabilities,
such	as	EU	staff	pensions.	Another	issue	is	contingent	liabilities,	in	relation	to	the	future	writing-off	of	loans	to	off-
budget	EU	entities	and	third	parties.	A	clean	break	would	have	enabled	any	future	financial	relationships,	such	as	for
research	and	security	collaboration,	to	be	contractually	based	and	financially	transparent.	However,	a	lump	sum	was
viewed	as	‘politically	impossible’,	because	the	numbers	would	look	too	big.	Also,	the	EU	27	and	the	UK	government
have	had	their	own	reasons	to	avoid	fiscal	transparency.
There	is	not	going	to	be	any	‘Brexit	dividend’	for	public	spending.	The	macroeconomic	effects	of	Brexit	on	the	public
finances	will	be	much	larger	–	for	example,	due	to	sterling	depreciation	and	GDP	growth	rates	being	lower	in	the
medium	term	than	they	would	otherwise	have	been.	Since	both	factors	are	hard	to	predict	clearly	in	advance,	this	is
a	period	of	massive	uncertainties.	One	scenario	is	that	Brexit	will	galvanise	the	UK	economy	in	the	long	term,	freed
from	EU	regulation	and	the	European	welfare	state	model.	Another	is	that	Brexit	does	long-term	damage	to	UK
economic	growth	and	productive	capacity,	thereby	producing	an	affordability	crisis	for	public	spending.
Whichever	scenario	applies,	the	UK	public	expenditure	climate	will	be	harsh	in	the	short	and	medium	term.
Generating	tax	revenues	faces	multiple	threats:	the	‘revolt	of	the	rich’	has	territorial	as	well	as	interpersonal
dimensions.	There	is	stagnant	measured	productivity.	Yet	the	economy	is	running	close	to	full	capacity,	so	higher
public	spending	would	have	to	be	financed	by	higher	taxation	and	resources	must	be	transferred	to	exports.
Implications	for	devolved	nations
These	continuing	pressures	will	affect	the	devolved	block	grants	that	are	controlled	by	the	Barnett	formula.	Within	the
present	constitutional	settlement,	the	Scottish	government’s	capacity	to	spend	is	determined	by	the	2016	Fiscal
Framework.	If	UK	government	spends	more	in	England	on	services	comparable	to	those	that	are	devolved	to
Holyrood,	then	Scotland	gains	via	the	Barnett	formula	consequentials.	If	less	is	spent	in	England	in	these	service
areas,	then	the	formula	produces	negative	consequentials.
Of	immediate	concern	to	all	three	devolved	nations	is	what	happens	after	Brexit	to	what	is	currently	EU	spending	in
their	jurisdictions.	The	Scottish	and	Welsh	governments	have	jointly	accused	the	UK	government	of	a	‘power	grab’	in
this	sphere,	for	example,	in	agriculture	which	is	more	EU-subsidised	in	the	devolved	nations	than	in	England.	This
conflict	is	a	reflection	of	the	tension	between	the	necessity	for	common	frameworks	across	the	UK	and	the	fact	that
the	UK	Parliament	and	government	both	see	devolved	institutions	as	subordinate	legislatures	and	governments,	not
as	equal	partners.
In	the	long-term,	it	is	not	clear	whether	present	levels	of	subsidy	will	be	maintained.	Trade	negotiations	with	the	EU
and	international	agreements	will	constrain	UK-wide	subsidy	policy.	In	the	short-term,	the	subsidy	money	could	be
held	centrally	by	the	Treasury,	allocated	to	the	devolved	administrations	as	Annually	Managed	Expenditure	outside
the	block,	or	put	into	the	Barnett-controlled	block.
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If	put	into	the	Barnett-controlled	blocks,	past	Treasury	practice	indicates	that	existing	spending	would	be	transferred
in,	so	that	future	changes	in	England	then	produce	positive	or	negative	Barnett	consequentials.	This	means	that	in
future,	subsidies	for	sheep	would	directly	compete	in	the	devolved	countries’	budgets	with	salaries	for	nurses.	This	is
the	major	risk	from	‘Barnetising’	agricultural	spending,	not	that	existing	spending	levels	would	immediately	go	down
to	the	Barnett	proportions.
Tax	futures	post	Brexit
If	Scotland’s	constitutional	future	and	Brexit	were	not	enough	to	consider,	there	is	growing	concern	about	the	ability
of	OECD	governments	to	sustain	their	tax	take	as	a	share	of	GDP	in	the	face	of	automation,	digitalisation,	and	the
power	of	multinational	oligopolies.
What	does	this	mean	for	UK	public	spending,	and	hence	for	Scottish	public	spending?	The	present	UK	fiscal
austerity,	though	not	deep	on	an	annual	basis,	is	the	longest	running	for	a	century.	Usually,	austerity	episodes	last
for	two	or	three	years,	and	then	the	brakes	come	off.	But	ten	years	after	the	2008	global	financial	crisis,	the	repairs	to
the	UK	public	finances	are	still	not	complete.
The	Scottish	government’s	2018-19	budget	decision	to	increase	the	basic	rate	of	income	tax	from	20%	to	21%	is
small	in	revenue	gains,	but	it	is	massively	symbolic.	The	last	increase	in	the	basic	rate	of	UK	personal	income	tax
was	in	1975.	Increasing	the	basic	rate	is	something	that	governments	have	either	not	wanted	to	do,	or	believed	was
‘politically	impossible’.
If	the	UK	public	wishes	to	maintain	the	present	pattern	of	publicly-financed	services,	then	most	people	will	have	to
pay	more	tax.	This	can	be	done	transparently,	or	through	devices	which	will	accentuate	the	faults	in	the	UK	tax
system	identified	by	the	Mirrlees	Report	of	2011.	If	there	is	no	political	willingness	to	do	this,	then	the	services	that
the	state	provides	for	citizens	will	either	be	openly	reduced,	or	allowed	to	deteriorate	to	unacceptable	standards.
Over	the	2010s,	total	funding	for	the	Scottish	government	has	been	reduced	by	5%	in	real	terms	–	that	is	taking
account	of	general	inflation,	not	of	the	inflation	specific	to	public	sector	inputs.	Holding	down	public	sector	pay	has
protected	service	levels,	but	pay	pressures	are	clearly	building	up.	At	times	in	the	2000s,	public	spending	was
increasing	by	up	to	4%	per	year	in	real	terms.
Conclusion							
To	some	extent,	Brexit	has	become	code	for	what	kind	of	economy	and	society	lies	ahead	for	the	peoples	of
Scotland	and	the	‘rest	of	the	United	Kingdom’	(rUK).	The	most	coherent	case	for	Brexit	is	made	by	those	who	wish	to
reject	what	they	characterise	as	the	sclerotic	European	social	model	of	too	much	public	spending	and	taxation,	too
much	welfare,	and	too	much	regulation.
Yet	two	big	questions	remain:
Will	Brexit	be	accompanied	by	a	policy-driven	reduction	in	the	size	of	the	UK	state?	Or	will	closeness	to	the
European	Union	in	trade	and	regulation	mean	that	not	much	changes?
Will	the	Scottish	Parliament	use	its	Scotland	Act	2016	taxation	powers	to	partially	offset	block	grant	reductions?
If	so,	will	that	lead	in	due	course	to	significant	tax	divergence	from	the	rUK,	or	will	the	UK	government	follow
what	Scotland	has	done?
_________
Note:	the	above	was	originally	published	on	LSE	Brexit.	It	forms	part	of	an	ESRC-funded	round	UK	tour	of	events
covering	the	governance,	constitutional	and	legal	aspects	of	Brexit,	which	reaches	London	for	a	key	event	on
Thursday	8	March:	all	welcome.
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David	Heald	(FAcSS,	FRSE)	is	Professor	of	Public	Sector	Accounting	at	the	Adam	Smith	Business
School,	University	of	Glasgow	and	a	key	expert	on	UK	public	spending.	His	latest	research	(open
access)	looks	at	whether	the	boards	of	public	sector	agencies	really	act	like	company	boards,	or	not.
David	Heald	and	his	Glasgow-Ulster	ESRC-funded	team	run	the	website	www.impactbrexit.com,	on
the	constitutional	and	fiscal	issues	arising	from	Brexit.
All	articles	posted	on	this	blog	give	the	views	of	the	author(s),	and	not	the	position	of	LSE	British
Politics	and	Policy,	nor	of	the	London	School	of	Economics	and	Political	Science.	Featured	image	credit:	Pixabay
(Public	Domain).
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